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ARGUMENT 
L The District Court Erred by Vacating the Arbitration Panel's Decision 
Appellants, hereinafter referred to as "the HOA," argue the arbitration award was 
properly vacated by the district court because the trial court acted within its discretionary 
powers in striking the jury demand. See Appellee's Brief pgs. 31-41. Mr. Rich will respond 
to the arguments presented by the HO A in support of their position. 
A. Trial Court Did Not H^ve Inherent Authority to Vacate Agreement of the 
Parties 
The HO A argues the trial court had the authority under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure to vacate the arbitration award. Appellee's Brief pg. 32-35. Mr. Rich 
disagrees. By entering into the Agreement dated September 21, 2005, in which the parties 
agreed to "arbitrate all issues arising under Case No. 050500428 MI pending in the Third 
District Court for Summit County and assigned to Judge Bruce C. Lubek," the parties 
properly granted the arbitration panel jurisdiction to arbitrate all claims arising under or 
relating to the case. See Appellant's Opening Brief, Appendix 3, pg. 1 f^ 1} Once the parties 
agreed to arbitrate "all of the issues" pending before the district court, the district court no 
longer retained jurisdiction over the dispute, except as set forth in the Utah Revised Uniform 
Arbitration Act ("Arbitration Act"). It is well established that arbitration awards can only be set 
!The Interim Award acknowledges both parties signed the September 21,2005 
Agreement which properly appointed the arbitration panel pursuant to paragraph 8.3 of the 
Declaration of Protective Covenants for Thaynes Canyon Subdivision. See Appellant's Opening 
Brief, Appendix Three, Interim Award, Introduction, f 1 pg. 1, ^ 1 pg. 2, ^ f 2-6 pg. 3. A copy of 
the September 21, 2005 Agreement was attached as Appendix One to Appellant's Opening brief. 
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aside under the Arbitration Act itself. See, e.g., Allredv. Educators Mut. Ins. Ass'n., 909P.2d 1263, 
1265 (Utah 1996). The HOA fails to address the policy of Utah law which favors arbitration as a 
speedy and inexpensive method of adjudicating disputes. Giannopulos v. Pappas, 15 P.2d353, 356 
(Ut. 1932). "To serve that policy and achieve those objectives, judicial review of arbitration awards 
should not be pervasive in scope or susceptible to repetitive adjudications; it should be strictly 
limited to the statutory grounds and procedures for review." Robinson & Wells, P. C. v. Warren, 669 
P.2d 844, 846 (Ut. 1983). The district court did not vacate the arbitration award pursuant to the 
"limited statutory grounds and procedures for review," but instead ignored the express Utah policy 
favoring arbitration and decided Mr. Rich had "waived" his right to arbitration.2 
B. Mr. Rich Did Not Waive His Right to Arbitrate 
The Arbitration panel correctly relied on the September 21, 2005 Agreement to arbitrate all 
disputes pending before the district court. In the alternative, the applicable CC&R's contained a 
mandatory arbitration provision. Mr. Rich demanded arbitration in compliance with the CC&R's 
and the trial court should have ordered arbitration on that basis. Waiver of arbitration must be 
intentional and the court may only infer waiver if the facts demonstrate that Mr. Rich intended to 
disregard his right to arbitrate. CentralFla. Invs., Inc. v. ParkwestAssocs., 40 P.3d 599, 608 (Utah 
2002). There is a strong presumption against finding that a party waived its right to arbitration. 
Baker v. Stevens, 114 P.2d 580, 583 (Utah 2002). 
The HOA argues Mr. Rich waived his right to arbitrate under the CC&R's because the notice 
to arbitrate was not properly served pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-31 a-110 and it was untimely. 
Appellee's Brief, pg. 37. The HOA is wrong on both counts. First, Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-110 
2The district court did not rely on or make any reference to the Arbitration Act when it 
vacated the Interim Award of the arbitration panel. 
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allows a person to initiate an arbitration proceeding by giving notice in the agreed manner between 
the parties. Service via certified or registered mail, return receipt requested, is only required in the 
absence of such agreement. Id. Section 8.3 of the CC&R's only requires written notice be given to 
the Association. Mr. DeCarlo hand-delivered the arbitration demand to the Association and 
therefore service was proper. R. 202-203; R. 963 f 2n. 
The HOA argues the notice was untimely because the trial court found Mr. Rich knew of the 
decision of the Association Trustees July 21,2005 as indicated in the Court's Ruling and Order dated 
October 6,2005. Appellee's Brief, pg. 37. However, the October 6,2005 Ruling and Order was not 
based on an evidentiary hearing, but merely the pleading submitted to the trial court and oral 
argument. R. 177. When the trial court had the opportunity to hear testimony at trial, the trial court 
entered a finding of fact with respect to the HOA's decision to reject the plans that Mr. Rich "did not 
receive that message until August as defendant was on vacation." R. 961. This finding of fact was 
made after the trial court heard the testimony of witnesses at trial. There is no finding of fact that 
Mr. Rich was made aware of the HOA's decision before he returned from his vacation. R. 961. 
When coupled with the strong presumption against finding a waiver of the right to arbitrate, the facts 
clearly support Mr. Rich's right to arbitrate the matter in accordance with paragraph 8.3 of the 
CC&R's. 
The district court improperly inferred a waiver of arbitration. As stated in the record, Mr. 
DeCarlo hand-delivered the arbitration demand to the Association on August 26,2005. R. 202-203; 
R. 963 \ 2n. The district court is prohibited from inferring a waiver of arbitration unless the facts 
demonstrate Mr. Rich intended to disregard his right to arbitrate. Central Fla.y 40 P.3d at 608. The 
HOA failed to present any facts from the record which demonstrate Mr. Rich intended to disregard 
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his right to arbitrate. On the contrary, the record sets forth facts demonstrating that Mr. Rich 
attempted to arbitrate the matter at every turn. First, Mr. Rich served the arbitration demand on the 
HOA. R. 963. Second, Mr. Rich filed a motion to dismiss the complaint based on the arbitration 
provision contained in Section 8.3 of the CC&R's. R. 33-35. Mr. Rich filed a renewed motion to 
dismiss once the arbitration panel had granted the Interim Award. R. 89-92. Mr. Rich fully 
participated in the arbitration proceeding. See Appellant's Opening Brief, Appendix 3. None of 
these facts demonstrate Mr. Rich intended to disregard his right to arbitrate, but support the position 
that the Interim Award was warranted and should have been acknowledged and accepted by the 
district court. 
C. Agreement to Arbitrate Constituted a Meeting of the Minds 
The HOA argues the September 21,2005 Agreement did not create a voluntary agreement 
between the parties because the HOA was ordered to arbitrate by the Court and there was no meeting 
of the minds in the Agreement. Appellee's Brief, pg. 39. 
The trial court ordered the parties "to cooperate fully with each other to complete the 
arbitration contemplated by Section 8.3 of the Declaration of Protective Covenants for Thaynes 
Canyon Subdivision dated August 21, 1971, by September 30, 2005." R. 45-47. The district court 
did not order the parties to enter into a new arbitration agreement, nor does the district court have 
the authority to require parties to enter into an arbitration agreement. Rather, the order of the district 
court was to cooperate and complete arbitration pursuant to Section 8.3 of the CC&R's. There was 
no order to sign an independent arbitration agreement. Section 8.3 of the CC&R's does not require 
an independent agreement to arbitrate. Nevertheless, the parties entered into an independent, binding 
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arbitration agreement dated September 21, 2005 in which they mutually agreed to arbitrate all 
pending issues in the case. 
The HOA claims their was no meeting of the minds because Mr. Rich's counsel inserted 
"additional conditions" in the arbitration agreement. Appellee's Brief, pg. 40. Mr. Rich's counsel 
did not insert additional conditions, but merely stated that Mr. Rich did not waive his rights to object 
to the jurisdiction and sufficiency of service of process, because Mr. Rich had filed motions to 
dismiss before the trial court which were under advisement. See Appellant's Brief, Appendix 1, pg. 
3. The arbitration panel correctly found that Mr. Rich never objected to the jurisdiction of the 
arbitration panel. Id. at Appendix 3, Interim Award, pg. 3^7. The arbitration panel determined the 
arbitration ceased to be Court-ordered when the parties signed the September 21,2005 Agreement. 
Id. af pg. 5 Tj 13. "There never was an objection to the arbitration to the arbitration hearing or to the 
Panel. In fact, both parties noted technical objections to arbitration, even as ordered by the Court, 
but waived those objections in favor of the arbitration, and confirmed that agreement in writing." 
Id. 
As noted in the appeal, Mr. Rich contested he was never properly served in the lawsuit filed 
by the HOA. The express reservation of Mr. Rich's right to contest the lack of proper service in the 
Arbitration Agreement was meant to preclude the unintended effect of waiving Mr. Rich's right to 
contest his pending motion for improper service before the district court. See Robinson v. Wells, 
P. C. v. Warren, 669 P.2d 844, 849 (Utah 1983)(by appearing generally in the arbitration proceeding 
defendant submitted to the jurisdiction of the district court). The reservation was limited to Mr. 
Rich's right to contest jurisdiction based on improper service. Nothing in the reservation pertained 
to the jurisdiction of the arbitration panel, nor the district court's authority to enforce the arbitration 
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panel's decision. The arbitration panel correctly decided the reservation was not an "additional 
condition" nor did it alter the jurisdiction of the arbitration panel or the district court. 
II. Whether Trial Court Properly Struck the Jury Was Preserved Below3 
The HOA claims Mr. Rich failed to preserve his claim concerning the trial court's decision 
to eliminate the jury. See Appellee's Brief, pg. 15. Mr. Rich disagrees. The issue was not only 
raised before the district court, but the parties were asked by the district court to brief the issue 
during the pre-trial conference. In response to this request, Mr. Rich submitted his Objection to 
Plaintiffs' Withdrawal of Jury Trial Demand. R. 855-866. In that objection, Mr. Rich argued the 
district court could not withdraw the jury pursuant to Rule 38(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure without the consent of all parties. R. 860. Mr. Rich concluded, "[t]he only possible way 
to remove the issues of this proceeding from the jury demanded by Plaintiffs is for the Court to 
determine a right of trial by jury does not exist." R. 861. Mr. Rich then fully briefed the issue and 
the matter was preserved before the district court. R. 860-865. For the reasons stated in Mr. Rich's 
opening brief, Mr. Rich submits the issue of whether the district court improperly struck the jury 
trial. 
III. Trial Court Erred by Awarding Attorney's Fees to Plaintiffs 
The HOA argues the limiting language of paragraph 7.3 of the CC&R's doesn't apply 
to Mr. Rich. Appellee's Brief, pg. 46. Instead, the HOA reads the words "officer and 
management of the Homeowners Association" into paragraph 7.3 by claiming the paragraph 
is "intended to protect the officers and management of the Homeowners Association from 
^Pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this reply brief is limited 
to answering any new matters set forth in the opposing brief Therefore, Mr. Rich will only 
respond to the new matters raised by the HOA. 
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any potential direct liability associated with their decisions/1 Id. This interpretation reads 
meaning and words into paragraph 7.3 that don't exist and violates the mandate to interpret 
contractual provisions using the plain language of the contract. The Court should interpret 
paragraph 7.3 according to the plain language in the contractual provision. The plain 
language states that "Neither Declarant, the Association, the Board of Trustees of the 
Association, the Architectural Committee nor any member, agent or employee of any of the 
same shall be liable to any party for any action or for any failure to act with respect to 
any matter if the action taken or failure to act was in good faith and without malice." 
See Appelleefs Brief, Addendum B (emphasis added). 
The HOA's interpretation of this provision ignores the phrase "or any member" and 
would have this Court restrict the application of 7.3 to "the officers and management of the 
Homeowners Association," which violates the basic tenet of contract interpretation that 
everything within a contract should be given effect. Id. at pg. 46. Mr. Rich was a member 
of the HOA. R.957, 2b. As a member of the HOA, Mr. Rich is entitled to the protection of 
paragraph 7.3. Under that provision, Mr. Rich is not liable to "any party" for "any action" 
or "for any failure to act with respect to any matter." The plain language of this contractual 
provision applies to the lawsuit filed by the HOA. The complaint was for enforcement of the 
CC&R!s. Section 7.3 is contained within the Enforcement Section of the CC&R's. The plain 
language does not restrict the limitation to apply only to plaintiffs or only to HOA members 
seeking to enforce the CC&R's, but to "any member" involved in "any action" or "for any 
failure to act with respect to any matter." The broad limitation in Paragraph 7.3 is limited to 
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actions or the failure to act in good faith and without malice. Therefore, according to the 
plain language, any member of the HOA is not subject to liability provided they act in good 
faith and without malice. This interpretation of the contractual provision comports with the 
basic tenet of giving all the contractual provisions effect. The district court found Mr. Rich 
did not act with malice or in bad faith. R. 1068. The HOA did not dispute this finding nor 
did they appeal this decision. Accordingly, under paragraph 7.3, Mr. Rich is not liable to the 
HOA for any attorneys fees, costs or any other expenses as he acted in good faith and 
without malice. 
A party requesting an award of attorney fees has the burden of presenting evidence sufficient 
to support the award. Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890, 893 (Utah 1996). The HOA 
failed to meet their burden of proving attorney's fees in this matter. 
CONCLUSION 
Pursuant to the CC&Rfs, the matter should have been arbitrated, was arbitrated and 
the arbitration decision should be affirmed and this case brought to an end. The matters 
presented on appeal were properly preserved at trial. Paragraph 7.3 of the Declaration 
prohibits the HOA from collecting attorneys fees and cost against Mr. Rich, as a member of 
the HOA who acted in good faith and without malice. Therefore the district court's award 
of attorney's fees should be reversed and Mr. Rich should be granted his attorney's fee 
incurred on appeal. 
Mr. Rich requests oral argument in this matter. 
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